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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal from orders enter ed by the District 
Court after a trial concerning the right to use the mark 
"The Drifters" for a singing group. Larry Marshak, who 
acquired a federally registered service mark for "The 
Drifters" name in 1978, brought this action against Faye 
Treadwell and others, claiming that they were infringing his 
mark. The defendants contended that Marshak's federally 
registered mark had been procur ed by fraud and that 
Marshak was infringing senior common-law rights. After a 
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trial and post-trial motions, the District Court or dered that 
Marshak's federally registered mark be canceled, 
permanently enjoined Marshak from using the mark in 
commerce, and required an accounting of all profits 
received by Marshak since he began using the mark. 
Marshak then took this appeal. We affir m in part and 
dismiss in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 
The Drifters were one of the classic popular singing 
groups of the 1950s and early 1960s. Among their well- 
known hits were "Under the Boardwalk," "On Broadway," 
and "Save the Last Dance for Me." 
 
The Drifters first appeared in 1953 and came under the 
management of George Treadwell the following year. From 
then until his death in 1967, George T readwell managed 
the group through The Drifters, Inc., a New York 
corporation that he formed. George T readwell hired and 
paid salaries to the members of the group, who changed 
continually over the years. He also scheduled the gr oup's 
performances, negotiated their r ecording contracts, and 
chose their music and arrangements. 
 
In 1959, George Treadwell r eleased all of the then- 
current members of the group and signed the former 
members of a group called the Five Crowns to perform as 
The Drifters. The new members included Charlie Thomas, 
Elsbeary Hobbs, and Dock Green. Like all other members of 
the Drifters, Thomas, Hobbs, and Green signed contracts 
that provided in pertinent part as follows: 
 
       The Artist agrees that the name THE DRIFTERS 
       belongs exclusively to the employer and that he will not 
       at any time use the name of The Drifters or any name 
       similar thereto or any name incorporating The Drifters. 
       In the event the employee leaves the employ of The 
       Drifters he will not in any way advertise or attempt to 
       publicize the fact that he had been a member of a 
       singing group known as The Drifters and will not 
       associate his name in any manner with The Drifters; 
       and he further acknowledges that the name, The 
       Drifters, is a valuable property and any violation of this 
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       paragraph could not be adequately compensated by 
       money damages and he therefore agr ees that the 
       employer shall be entitled to an injunction in any 
       Court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin any violation 
       or threatened violation of the contract by the Artist. 
 
App. at 1264. 
 
When George Treadwell died, his wife, Faye Treadwell, 
whom he married in 1955, became the sole shar eholder of 
The Drifters, Inc., and she took over the management of the 
group. She later formed Treadwell's Drifters, Inc., a New 
Jersey corporation, and all of the assets and contractual 
rights of The Drifters, Inc. were transferr ed to the new 
corporation. 
 
By the time of George Treadwell's death, Hobbs and 
Green had already left the group. Charlie Thomas left 
shortly thereafter, but other members continued to perform 
under Treadwell's direction. By the late 1960s, however, the 
popularity of "The Drifters" and similar gr oups had waned 
in this country, and Treadwell focused her efforts on 
Europe, where the group remained popular. After 1970, the 
Drifters made few live appearances in this country, but the 
group's classic recordings continued to be played on the 
radio, and Atlantic Records continued to pay r oyalties to 
The Drifters, Inc. or Treadwell's Drifters, Inc. See App. at 
720. 
 
Larry Marshak's involvement with The Drifters began in 
1969. CBS radio had recently changed fr om a 
contemporary to an "oldies" format. T o generate 
enthusiasm for its format change, CBS appr oached Rock 
Magazine and proposed a partnership to r eunite old singing 
groups to perform live concerts. Marshak, who was an 
editor at Rock Magazine, was given the task of reuniting 
some of these groups for the first revival concert at the New 
York Academy of Music. Among the groups that Marshak 
attempted to reunite was "The Drifters." Marshak contacted 
several former members of the group, including Thomas, 
Hobbs, and Green, all of whom agreed to perform for 
Marshak. The revival concerts were a success, and the 
reunited members agreed to continue per forming under 
"The Drifters" name. In 1972, Thomas, Hobbs, and Green 
signed an exclusive management contract with Marshak. 
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Soon after the revival group began per forming, Marshak 
received a letter from Treadwell's attorney asserting that 
Marshak was infringing her right to use the gr oup's name. 
App. at 244. The letter pointed out that the for mer 
members of the group had signed contracts with The 
Drifters, Inc. in which they had given up any right to use 
the group name. Id. Despite this war ning, Marshak 
persisted in his efforts to promote and market his group. 
 
In 1971, Treadwell brought an action against Marshak in 
state court in New York. Treadwell's request for a 
preliminary injunction to prevent Marshak and his group 
from using "The Drifters" name was denied, and the suit 
was eventually dismissed in 1973 because Tr eadwell 
"willfully defaulted and failed to answer interr ogatories 
propounded by defendants." App. at 1245. At the trial in 
the current case, Treadwell testified that she and her group 
stopped performing in the United States in part because 
she did not have the financial resour ces to defend her mark 
against Marshak through extended litigation. See App. at 
598. 
 
Marshak, in contrast, benefitted from a r enewed interest 
in "The Drifters" in the United States that had resulted 
from a wave of nostalgia for the early days of rock and roll. 
Throughout the 1970s, Marshak's group made recordings, 
appeared on television, and gave live per formances. 
 
Marshak began to litigate against other groups that used 
the name "The Drifters" or a variant. In 1976, Marshak 
learned that "The Platters," another r evived 1950s singing 
group, had been successful in preventing others from using 
their name by registering their service mark, and Marshak 
urged Thomas, Hobbs, and Green to do the same. Marshak 
convinced the trio that if they agreed to assign their rights 
to the name to him, he would continue as their manager 
and prevent others groups from using"The Drifters" name. 
In December 1976, Thomas, Hobbs, and Green, acting as a 
partnership, filed an application with the United States 
Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) to r egister "The Drifters" 
as a service mark for a singing group, and they assigned 
their rights to Marshak. See App. at 1267. In their 
registration application, Thomas, Hobbs, and Gr een each 
attested that 
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       no other person, firm, corporation, or association, to 
       the best of his knowledge and belief, has the right to 
       use such mark in commerce either in the identical 
       form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as to 
       be likely, when applied to the goods of such other 
       person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
       deceive. 
 
See 15 U.S.C. S 1051 (1976). 
 
Marshak filed the present action in 1995, following the 
publication of Faye Treadwell's book, Save the Last Dance 
for Me, in which Treadwell claimed to be the sole owner of 
the Drifters mark. See App. at 875. Named as defendants 
were Faye Treadwell, The Drifters, Inc., Treadwell's Drifters, 
Inc., and a booking company. Marshak alleged that the 
defendants had infringed his mark and had thr eatened to 
continue to do so by offering Tr eadwell's book for sale and 
by engaging a group to perform as The Drifters. He asserted 
a claim under Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
S 1114(a), for infringement of his federally r egistered mark, 
as well as a claim under Section 43(a), 15 U.S.C.S 1125(a), 
and under the statutes of New York for violation of his 
common-law rights. He sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief and treble and punitive damages. 
 
In their answer, the defendants claimed that Treadwell's 
Drifters had a superior common-law right to the mark, and 
they asserted as an affirmative defense that Marshak's 
federal registration had been procur ed by fraud. As a 
counterclaim, Treadwell's Drifters r epeated the allegation of 
fraudulent procurement. In addition, alleging that Marshak 
had infringed and continued to infringe its common-law 
right to the mark, Treadwell's Drifters asserted a claim 
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and a state-law 
claim for unfair competition. The counterclaim sought, 
among other things, cancellation of Marshak's mark, 
declaratory and injunctive relief, and an accounting of 
Marshak's profits. 
 
The case was tried before a jury, which found that 
Marshak or his assignors had perpetrated a fraud on the 
PTO in 1976. See App. at 1562. In accor dance with this 
finding, the District Court ordered the PTO to cancel 
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Marshak's federal registration. The jury also found, 
however, that Treadwell and her corporation had 
abandoned their common-law right to "The Drifters" mark 
by 1976. Moreover, the jury found that Marshak had 
established protectable common-law rights in the name by 
that time. 
 
On cross post-trial motions, the District Court upheld the 
jury's verdict regarding Marshak's fraud on the PTO, but 
the Court vacated the jury verdict insofar as it found that 
Treadwell had abandoned her rights in 1976. Instead, the 
Court held that the continuous stream of r oyalty revenues 
collected by Treadwell since the 1960s was sufficient to 
defeat Marshak's claim of abandonment. See Marshak v. 
Treadwell, 58 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 1999). After 
additional briefing regarding appr opriate remedies, the 
Court molded the judgment to reflect that Marshak had 
infringed Treadwell's Drifters' common law rights. The 
Court then permanently enjoined Marshak fr om further use 
of the "The Drifters" mark in commerce and ordered an 
accounting of Marshak's profits for the entir e period of his 
infringement -- viz., from 1970 to 1998. Marshak appealed. 
 
II. 
 
We begin by examining our jurisdiction to r eview the 
various orders challenged on appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(a)(1), we plainly have jurisdiction to review the 
permanent injunction prohibiting Marshak from using The 
Drifters mark. Under Santana Products, Inc. v. Compression 
Polymers, Inc., 8 F.3d 152 (3d Cir . 1993), the order 
requiring cancellation of Marshak's federally r egistered 
mark, standing alone, is not appealable under S 1292(a)(1), 
but Santana Products did not r each the question whether 
an order of cancellation may be reviewed pursuant to 
S 1292(a)(1) when a district court also issues an injunction 
against the use of the mark, as occurred her e. 8 F.3d at 
155 & n.3. 
 
When we have jurisdiction to review an or der relating to 
an injunction under S 1292(a)(1), our jurisdiction extends to 
matters inextricably linked to the appealable or der. See 
S.E.C. v. Black, 163 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1998). In this 
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case, the ground on which cancellation of the federally 
registered mark was ordered-- fraud on the PTO -- was 
also asserted by Treadwell as a defense to Marshak's claim 
that she was infringing his incontestable mark. All of the 
arguments raised by Marshak on appeal in connection with 
the cancellation order apply as well to that defense. Under 
these circumstances, the link between the or der of 
cancellation and the injunctive order is close enough to 
permit review of the order of cancellation at this time. See 
Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co. v. Saunders Archery Co., 516 F.2d 
846, 849 (8th Cir. 1975) (court has jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1), to examine the merits of order granting 
a permanent injunction and ordering the cancellation of 
registration). 
 
By contrast, we lack jurisdiction to review the portion of 
the District Court order requiring an accounting of 
Marshak's profits. Marshak contends that we have 
jurisdiction under the final order rule of 28 U.S.C. S 1291, 
but we do not agree. A final order is one that "leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." 
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). A finding 
of liability that does not also specify damages is not a final 
decision. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 
737, 744 (1976); Sun Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. Benefits 
Rev. Bd., 535 F.2d 758, 760 (3d Cir . 1976). Although the 
practical finality rule, also known as the For gay-Conrad 
doctrine, permits appellate review of an order that is not 
technically final but resolves all issues that are not purely 
ministerial, see Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 
204-05 (1848); Cromaglass Corp. v. Fer m, 500 F.2d 601, 
605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), the accounting at issue in this 
case does not come within that rule. 
 
Our decision in Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 27 
F.3d 931 (3d Cir. 1994), a trademark infringement case, is 
apposite. In Apex Fountain Sales, the District Court entered 
a contempt order that, among other things, or dered an 
accounting of the net profits realized from sale of the 
infringing items. We held that the or der was not reviewable 
under the Forgay Conrad doctrine because the 
determination of net profits would not be easily reached. 
See id. at 936. 
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In Goodman v. Lee, 988 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1993), the 
Fifth Circuit addressed circumstances similar to those with 
which we are confronted. In that case, Shirley Goodman 
sued the heirs of her former recor ding partner, Audrey Lee, 
for copyright ownership rights to their 1956 hit song, "Let 
the Good Times Roll." The jury found in favor of Goodman, 
and the District Court ordered the r egistrar of copyrights to 
correct the records of the copyright office to reflect 
Goodman's ownership. Furthermore, the Court ordered 
Lee's heirs to account to Goodman for one-half of all 
royalties paid over the 29-year period between the time of 
the song's release and the date of the judgment. The 
District Court did not reduce the award to a certain sum. 
 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged a line of cases 
in which appeal had been permitted prior to afinal 
accounting because the accounting was viewed as"purely 
`ministerial' and/or `mechanical.' " Id. at 626 (citing Winston 
Network v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., 944 F .2d 1351 (7th 
Cir. 1991); Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F .2d 1397 (7th Cir. 
1985)). However, the Goodman Court concluded that the 
accounting in the case before it would not be purely 
ministerial: 
 
       The award contemplates identifying royalties paid on 
       one particular song to songwriter now dead and 
       thereafter to his heirs over an almost thirty (30) year 
       period. . . . Clearly, the amount to be divided is not 
       known, was not identified in the extensive district 
       court experience and must be reconstructed r equiring 
       factual determinations by the district court. 
 
Id. at 627. Therefore, the Court held that the judgment was 
not within the Forgay-Conrad rule and was not an 
appealable final order. Id. 
 
A similar result was reached in Zwack v. Kraus Bros & 
Co., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956). There, a Hungarian firm 
sought injunctive relief against its United States distributor 
to enforce its trademark, as well as damages and an 
accounting of profits. The District Court held the 
distributor liable but referred the matter to a special master 
for an accounting of profits. The Second Cir cuit held that 
the reference to the special master to determine damages 
rendered the entire order interlocutory. See id. at 261. 
 
                                9 
  
In this case, as in the cases noted above, the accounting 
cannot reasonably be characterized as mer ely ministerial. 
The District Court ordered Marshak "to account to 
Treadwell for the profits he ear ned in each year, beginning 
with the first act of infringement in 1970 and ending with 
the first day of trial testimony in this case." App. at 87. As 
in Apex Fountain Sales, the parties her e have a long history 
of contentious litigation, and there is a substantial 
likelihood that "one or both parties will dispute the ultimate 
amount of damages awarded, leading to a second appeal. 
This would be contrary to the federal judiciary's general 
policy against piecemeal litigation." Apex Fountain Sales, 27 
F.3d at 935. 
 
We are aware that the District Court, in denying 
Treadwell's request that a special master be appointed, 
expressed the opinion that "the accounting will not be 
complicated or exceptional," App. at 1687 n.2, but that 
statement was made in a notably differ ent context. An 
accounting may seem simple enough to persuade a District 
Court that the appointment of a special master is not 
necessary and still be far from ministerial in the sense 
relevant here. We must ther efore dismiss Marshak's appeal 
insofar as it contests the portion of the district court order 
requiring an accounting.1 
 
III. 
 
Turning to the merits of the issues over which we have 
jurisdiction, we first consider Marshak's ar guments relating 
to Treadwell's fraudulent procur ement defense and 
counterclaim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We are thus unable to expr ess our view as to whether any accounting 
should have been limited to the period of the appr opriate statute of 
limitations. If on remand the District Court goes forward with the 
accounting, consideration of the propriety of that remedy will have to 
await the completion of the accounting and the entry of a final order. We 
recognize that this procedure may r esult in a considerable waste of time 
and resources in connection with the accounting, but the scope of our 
appellate jurisdiction leaves no alternative. 
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A. 
 
Marshak argues that the fraudulent procur ement defense 
and counterclaim are time-barred. Relying chiefly on our 
decision in Beauty Time, Inc. v. VU Skin Sys., Inc., 118 F.3d 
140, 143 (3d Cir. 1997), Marshak maintains that the 
Lanham Act does not specify the time within which a claim 
of fraudulent procurement may be asserted, that it is 
therefore appropriate to borr ow the most analogous state 
statute of limitations, and that under the most analogous 
state statute -- either the New York or the New Jersey six- 
year statute of limitations for actions sounding in fraud -- 
Treadwell's claim is barred. W e reject this argument based 
on the plain language of the Lanham Act. 
 
Treadwell's counterclaim was br ought under Section 14 
of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1064, which specifies in 
detail the time limits for petitioning to cancel a mark on 
various grounds. This provision states in relevant part: 
 
       A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the 
       grounds relied upon, may, upon payment of the 
       prescribed fee, be filed as follows by any person who 
       believes that he is or will be damaged . . . by the 
       registration of a mark on the principal r egister 
       established by this chapter . . . 
 
           * * * 
 
       (1) Within five years from the date of the registration 
       of the mark under this chapter. 
 
       (2) Within five years from the date of publication 
       under section 1062(c) of this title of a mark 
       registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act 
       of February 20, 1905. 
 
       (3) At any time if the register ed mark becomes the 
       generic name for the goods or services, or a portion 
       thereof, for which it is registered, or has been 
       abandoned, or its registration was obtained 
       fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of section 
       1054 of this title or of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of 
       section 1052 of this title for a registration under this 
       chapter. 
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Lanham Act S 14, 15 U.S.C. S 1064 (emphasis added). 
 
The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine 
"whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular 
dispute in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 
337, 340 (1997). See also, e.g., Michael C. v. Radnor 
Township Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 648-49 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F .3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(en banc). "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory 
language is determined by reference to the language itself, 
the specific context in which that language is used, and the 
broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson, 519 
U.S. at 341. Where we find that the statutory language has 
a clear meaning, we need not look further. Id. at 340. 
 
Here, the meaning of the phrase "at any time" in Section 
14 (3) is clear even if that particular subsection is viewed in 
isolation. Moreover, the contrast between the five-year time 
limits imposed in subsections (1) and (2) and the use of the 
phrase "at any time" in subsection (3) r einforces the point 
that the language of subsection (3) means what it says: a 
petition falling within subsection (3), including a petition 
seeking cancellation based on fraud, is not subject to any 
time limit but may be filed "at any time." W e note that the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the pr edecessor of the 
current Section 14(3) "allows cancellation of an 
incontestable mark at any time . . . if it was obtained 
fraudulently." Park `n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 
469 U.S. 189, 195 (1985) (emphasis added).2 
 
We recognize that Section 14(3) itself applies to a petition 
filed with the Patent and Trademark Office, rather than a 
claim asserted in court, but Section 37 of the Lanham Act, 
15 U.S.C. S 1119,3 gives federal courts concurrent authority 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We also note that the PTO has consistently held that the phrase "at 
any time" precludes a laches defense to a cancellation action premised 
on fraudulent procurement. See Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1828, 1831 (T.T.A.B. 1994); TBC Corp. v. Grand Prix Ltd., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1311, 1313 (T.T.A.B. 1989); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Leupold & Stevens, 
Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (T .T.A.B. 1986). 
 
3. Section 37 provides: 
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to cancel registered marks when the validity of the mark is 
called into question in a judicial proceeding. See Ditri v. 
 
Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 
873 (3d Cir. 1992); Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic 
Stop Nut Corp., 257 F.2d 485, 491 (3d Cir . 1958). As we 
explained in Ditri, "[a]lthough a petition to the Patent and 
Trademarks Office is the primary means of securing a 
 
cancellation, the district court has concurr ent power to 
order cancellation as well for the obvious r eason that an 
entire controversy may thus be expediently resolved in one 
forum." Id. at 873. We see no r eason why Congress would 
have wanted to allow a petition for cancellation under 
 
Section 14(3) to be filed with the PTO "at any time" but to 
subject an identical request, when entertained by a District 
Court pursuant to its concurrent power under Section 37, 
to a state statute of limitations. Such a regime would 
prevent a case like the one before us fr om being 
 
"expediently resolved in one forum." Id. 
 
The language of the Lanham Act also makes it clear that 
 
there is no time limit on the assertion of fraudulent 
procurement as a defense to an infringement claim brought 
by the holder of a mark that has become incontestable. 
Under Section 15 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1065, an 
otherwise incontestable mark may be attacked "on a 
ground for which application to cancel may befiled at any 
time under paragraphs (3) and (5) of section 1064 of this 
 
title." Accordingly, the language of the Lanham Act makes 
it clear that a claim for cancellation of a mark based on 
fraudulent procurement and a defense to an otherwise 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       In any action involving a registered mark the court may determine 
       the right to registration, order the cancellation of registrations, 
and 
       otherwise rectify the register with r espect to the registrations 
of any 
       party to the action. Decrees and orders shall be certified by the 
       court to the Director, who shall make appropriate entry upon the 
       records of the Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled 
       thereby. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1119. 
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incontestable mark on a similar ground may be asserted at 
any time.4 
 
The reason for this rule is quite simple--the interest 
vindicated by Section 14 is not just the injury to the 
challenging party, but the integrity of the r egister. Where 
the interest at issue is the integrity of the federal register, 
a statute of limitations should not operate to frustrate that 
interest. See Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 
1831 (T.T.A.B. 1994) ("The Boar d has held that the 
equitable defenses of laches and estoppel ar e not available 
against claims of fraud and abandonment because ther e 
exists a broader interest--a `public policy' interest--in 
addition to a private interest in removing from the register 
those registrations procured or maintained by fraud and 
those registrations for marks that have been abandoned."); 
TBC Corp. v. Grand Prix Ltd., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1311, 1313 
(T.T.A.B. 1989) ("Where the pr oposed ground for 
cancellation is abandonment, equitable defenses should be 
unavailable for the same reason they have been held 
unavailable when the ground asserted is descriptiveness or 
fraud. It is in the public interest to r emove abandoned 
registrations from the register . We therefore hold that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The origins of the "at any time" language of Section 14(3) support this 
conclusion. This language derives from Section 13 of the Trademark Act 
of 1905, 15 U.S.C. S 93. That section pr ovided that "whenever any 
person shall deem himself injured by the r egistration of a trade-mark in 
the Patent Office he may at any time apply to the Commissioner of 
Patents to cancel the registration." (emphasis added). The accepted 
meaning of the phrase "at any time" under the 1905 Act was that it 
excluded the defense of laches in a cancellation pr oceeding. See Dwinell- 
Wright Co. v. National Fruit Prod. Co., 129 F.2d 848, 853 (1st Cir. 1942); 
White House Milk Prods. Co. v. Dwinell-W right Co., 111 F.2d 490, 493 
(C.C.P.A. 1940); Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. Hartogensis, 41 F.2d 94, 97 
(C.C.P.A. 1930). The language in the 1905 Act, in turn, was derived from 
a line of Supreme Court precedent holding that laches would not bar an 
injunction against future infringement, but only an accounting for past 
profits. See Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900); 
Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. (6 
Otto.) 245 (1877). It is telling that although the Lanham Act now 
specifically provides that an infringement action is subject to equitable 
defenses, see 15 U.S.C. S 1125, the statute continues to provide that a 
mark is vulnerable to a cancellation proceeding"at any time." 
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prior registration defense is unavailable in a proceeding 
where the issue is abandonment."). Accor dingly, we hold 
that Treadwell's fraudulent procur ement defense and 
counterclaim were not time-barred. 
 
Marshak's only attempt to address the language of the 
Lanham Act permitting fraudulent procur ement to be 
asserted in these contexts "at any time" appears in his 
reply brief, where he argues that this language merely 
reflects the fact that the grounds for cancellation covered 
by Section 14(3), such as a mark's becoming generic,"are 
of a type in which the right to bring cancellation may arise 
`at any time', i.e., some years (very possibly more that the 
five years of Section 1064(1)) after trademark r egistration." 
Reply Br. at 4 (emphasis in original). Marshak suggests that 
once a plaintiff has become aware of the necessary 
predicate for bringing a cancellation pr oceeding, the 
plaintiff should be required to do so within the limitations 
period specified by the most analogous state statute. 
 
Marshak's argument cannot be reconciled with the plain 
language of Section 14(3), which, as noted, pr ovides 
unambiguously that a petition seeking cancellation based 
on fraudulent procurement "may . . . befiled" "at any time." 
Marshak would read Section 14(3) as essentially a tolling 
provision, but the drafters of this provision would surely 
have selected different language if that is what they had 
intended. For all these reasons, we hold that T readwell's 
counterclaim and defense are not time-barr ed. 
 
This holding is entirely consistent with our decision in 
Beauty Time, on which Marshak relies. In Beauty Time, 
count XI of the complaint asserted a claim under Section 
38 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1120, which provides as 
follows: 
 
       Any person who shall procure registration in the Patent 
       and Trademark Office of a mark by a false or 
       fraudulent declaration or representation, oral or in 
       writing, or by any false means, shall be liable in a civil 
       action by any person injured thereby for any damages 
       sustained in consequence thereof. 
 
A claim for damages brought under Section 38 is not 
governed by any of the time limits set out in Section 14(3) 
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or any other provision of the Act specifying a limitations 
period, and therefore we held that the plaintiff 's Section 38 
claim for fraud was subject to Pennsylvania's two-year 
statute of limitations for actions based on fraud. 118 F.3d 
at 143-49. We did not mention Section 14(3) or suggest that 
a request for cancellation pursuant to that section is 
subject to a state statute of limitations. Thus, Beauty Time 
does not support Marshak's argument her e.5 
 
B. 
 
Marshak argues that Treadwell's fraudulent procurement 
defense and counterclaim were barr ed by principles of 
collateral estoppel. In the District Court, Marshak relied on 
several prior adjudications, but on appeal he focuses on 
Marshak v. Sheppard, 666 F.Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), a 
Lanham Act action brought by Marshak against, among 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Marshak also relies (see Appellant's Br . at 33, Reply Br. at 2) on the 
statement in 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on T rademarks and 
Unfair Competition S 31:59, at 31-108 (4th ed. 2000), that "[w]hen fraud 
is used as a basis for challenging the validity of an incontestable 
registration, the claim must be asserted within the relevant statute of 
limitations." On its face, this statement supports Marshak's argument, 
but we decline to follow it in the particular context here, i.e., where 
Section 14(3) applies. The treatise does not attempt to explain how this 
sweeping statement can be reconciled with the language of Section 14(3), 
and elsewhere the treatise recognizes that a request to cancel based on 
fraud may be filed at any time. 5 McCarthy, supra, S 31:80. 
Furthermore, the authority cited by the treatise in support of this 
statement, Calzaturificio Rangoni S.p.A. v. United States Shoe Corp., 868 
F.Supp. 1414 (S.D.N.Y 1994), is unconvincing. Borrowing a state statute 
of limitations, the District Court in that case r elied solely on a prior 
District Court decision that had applied a state statute to a false 
advertising claim brought under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See 
868 F.Supp. at 1420 (relying on PepsiCo., Inc. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber 
Corp., 578 F.Supp. 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y . 1984)). A false advertising claim 
under Section 43(a), however, is quite dif ferent from a request for 
cancellation under Section 14(3). Assuming that it is appropriate to 
apply a state statute to such a Section 43(a) claim, it does not follow 
that 
all other Lanham Act claims or defenses relating to fraud must be 
treated similarly even if the language of the Act expressly addresses the 
question of the time within which those claims or defense may be 
asserted. 
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others, a performer who appeared with a group called "Rick 
Sheppard and the Drifters."6 In that case, Sheppard 
unsuccessfully sought cancellation of Marshak's r egistered 
mark on grounds very similar to those asserted by 
Treadwell in this case, and Marshak contends that 
Treadwell is bound by the judgment in that case. Marshak 
acknowledges that Treadwell was not a party in Marshak v. 
Sheppard, but he maintains that she is bound on the 
ground that she wielded a "laboring oar" on behalf of the 
defendants. Appellant's Br. at 49. 
 
The principle on which Marshak relies is aptly stated as 
follows in the Restatement (Second) of JudgmentsS 39: 
 
       A person who is not a party to an action but who 
       controls or substantially participates in the control of 
       the presentation on behalf of a party is bound by the 
       determination of issues decided as though he were a 
       party. 
 
Comment c. adds: 
 
       To have control of litigation requir es that a person have 
       effective choice as to the legal theories and proofs to be 
       advanced in behalf of the party to the action. He must 
       also have control over the opportunity to obtain review. 
 
Cf. Collins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 34 F.3d 172, 
176 (3d Cir. 1994) (New Jersey law). 
 
Here, Marshak has not pointed to any dir ect evidence 
that Treadwell exercised any contr ol over the prior 
litigation. Indeed, his brief notes only two concr ete facts 
that are relevant: Treadwell testified in the prior case and 
had an interest in the outcome (in the sense that she would 
have benefitted if Marshak's federally registered mark had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The section of Marshak's brief concerning collateral estoppel 
(Appellant's Br. at 48-49) does not r efer to the dismissal of Treadwell's 
1971 action in New York state court. As noted, that case was dismissed 
because Treadwell did not comply with discovery. The District Court held 
that, under New York law, such a dismissal was without prejudice. See 
Marshak, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 562 n.17 (citing Maitland v. Trojan Elec. & 
Mach. Co., 480 N.E.2d 736, 737 (N.Y. 1985)). Because Marshak does not 
rely on this dismissal as a basis for his collateral estoppel argument, we 
need not consider that issue here. 
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been ordered canceled). Appellant's Br . at 49. Without 
more, these facts are plainly insufficient to permit a 
reasonable inference that she exer cised any control over 
litigation decisions or strategy. Marshak's collateral 
estoppel argument must therefore be rejected. 
 
C. 
 
Marshak contends that the jury's finding of fraud was 
based on an erroneous jury instruction, which stated that 
fraud on the PTO could be shown by proof that the 
applicants "should have known" about T readwell's superior 
right to "The Drifters" name. Although we agr ee with 
Marshak that this instruction was erroneous, we are 
convinced that the error was harmless. 
 
Most of the District Court's lengthy instruction on 
fraudulent intent is unobjectionable,7  but at several points, 
the Court told the jury that "[t]he defense of fraud will turn 
upon whether you believe that the persons who r egistered 
the mark knew or reasonably should have known that 
someone else had legal rights to the name `The Drifters.' " 
App. at 1482-83 (emphasis added). Marshak objects that 
the "should have known" language misstates the nature of 
the PTO oath and the requisite measure of proof. 
 
At the time when Thomas, Hobbs, and Green submitted 
their declaration, an applicant was requir ed to state that 
 
       no other person, firm, corporation, or association, to 
       the best of his knowledge and belief, has the right to 
       use such mark in commerce either in the identical 
       form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as to 
       be likely, when applied to the goods of such other 
       person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
       deceive. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1051 (1976) (emphasis added). Thus, applicants 
attested only to their own subjective knowledge and belief. 
 
To demonstrate that a federal registration was 
fraudulently procured, therefor e, a challenging party must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Much of the charge is set forth in the District Court's opinion. See 
Marshak, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67. 
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adduce evidence that the registrant actually knew or 
believed that someone else had a right to the mark. See 
Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Network Inc., 104 F.3d 
336, 340 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also 5 McCarthy supra, 
S 31:76. Accordingly the instruction given by the District 
Court was not entirely correct.8  
 
The error, however, was har mless because " `it is highly 
probable that [it] did not affect the outcome of the case.' " 
West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F .3d 744, 752 (3d Cir. 
1995). The "should have known" language used by the 
District Court could have affected the ver dict only if a 
properly instructed jury would have found that the 
applicants had an actual but unreasonable belief that no 
one else had a right to use "The Drifters" name. However, 
based on the evidence in this case, we are convinced that 
a properly instructed jury would not have made such a 
finding. Marshak has not called to our attention any 
appreciable evidence that the applicants had a sincere 
belief that no one else had a right to the mark, and there 
was very strong evidence to the contrary. Marshak's cross- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In support of its instruction, the District Court relied on G.H. Mumm 
& CIE v. Desnoes & Geddes, Ltd., 917 F.2d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 1990), 
and Torres v. Cantine Torresella S.r.l., 808 F.2d 46, 49 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
In both of those cases, the Court stated that an applicant knowingly 
attempts to mislead the PTO if the applicant files a renewal application 
stating that its mark is currently in use in interstate commerce but the 
applicant "knows or should know" that this is not true. Neither case 
involved a jury instruction, and we do not interpr et those cases as 
taking 
the position that proof of subjective bad faith is unnecessary in order to 
prove fraud on the PTO. On the contrary, T orres emphasizes that an 
applicant must act "knowingly" in order to commit such a fraud. 808 
F.2d at 48. We understand these opinions to mean simply that in the 
particular context presented there -- where the representation related to 
a matter about which the applicant almost certainly had subjective 
knowledge, i.e., whether the applicant's own company was using the 
mark in commerce -- proof that the applicant should have known was 
ample to prove actual knowledge. We note that the Federal Circuit has 
subsequently held that proof of actual knowledge or belief is necessary 
in the context of fraudulent procurement.See Metro Traffic Control, 104 
F.3d at 340. We also note that even T readwell's brief seems to give G.H. 
Mumm and Torres a similarlynarrow interpretation. See Appellee's Br. at 
48-49 & n. 12. 
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examination, in which excerpts of Thomas' deposition were 
read, essentially produced the admission that George 
Treadwell had been "the true owner of the Drifters' name," 
that George Treadwell "had rights to the name," and that 
Thomas had simply been "an employee." App. 470. 
Similarly, when Marshak was asked whether a member of 
"The Drifters" during the George T readwell era "would . . . 
have had the right to use the name Drifters," Marshak 
responded that "[t]he only person who has the right to the 
name is the person that develops it and keeps it in the 
public's eye." App. 510. Marshak also testified that a 
member of "The Drifters" was simply an "employee" and 
that an employee of a group that provides entertainment 
cannot "go around saying he is [the gr oup]." See App. 1662. 
In view of the evidence, we are convinced that the mistake 
in the jury instruction was harmless. 
 
D. 
 
Marshak's final argument concerning fraudulent 
procurement is that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the jury's finding. The jury's ver dict must be 
sustained if it is rationally supported, see Starceski v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1098 (3d Cir. 
1995), and the verdict here has ample support. In addition 
to the direct evidence just mentioned r egarding the 
applicants' and Marshak's subjective knowledge and belief, 
there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which 
such knowledge or belief could be inferred. As noted, the 
applicants had signed contracts acknowledging that the 
name "The Drifters" belonged exclusively to their employer 
and that they had no right to that name. Under those 
contracts, if they left the group, they could not even 
publicize the fact that they had been members. 
 
In arguing that the evidence was insufficient, Marshak 
relies on the 1971 ruling of the New York state court 
denying Treadwell's request for a pr eliminary injunction 
and opining that Treadwell had not established that 
Marshak or the members of his group "ha[d] been infringing 
upon [her] good name and good will." App. 724. This was 
certainly evidence for the jury to consider, but it is 
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insufficient to overturn the jury's ver dict.9 We thus hold 
that fraud in the procurement of the federal mark was 
properly proven and that cancellation was justified. 
 
IV. 
 
We now consider Marshak's arguments r elating to 
Treadwell's claim that Marshak was infringing upon her 
superior common-law right. As previously noted, the 
counterclaim of Treadwell's Drifters asserted a claim under 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a), based 
on Marshak's alleged infringement of their common law 
right to "The Drifters" mark. In order to prove this claim, 
the counterclaimant was required to show that "(1) the 
mark [was] valid and legally protectable; (2) the mark [was] 
owned by the plaintiff; and (3) [Marshak's] use of the mark 
to identify goods or services [was] likely to create confusion 
concerning the origin of the goods or services." Fisons 
Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d 
Cir. 1994). The jury did not find that the counterclaimant 
had established these elements. On the contrary, the jury 
found that Treadwell and her companies had abandoned 
their common law rights and that Marshak had not used 
"The Drifters" name in such a way as to misr epresent the 
source of his goods or services or to falsely suggest a 
connection between those services and Tr eadwell's Drifters. 
App. at 1562. The District Court, however, explicitly 
granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the 
counterclaimant on the issue of abandonment and, in 
effect, did the same thing with respect to the entire Section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The evidence regarding the 1971 state court ruling does not 
undermine our conclusion that the error in the jury instruction 
discussed in part III.C, supra, was har mless. The jury instruction error 
related to the question of subjective knowledge or belief, but the 
evidence 
concerning the 1971 state court ruling is evidence of objective 
reasonableness, not the applicants' subjective state of mind. As the 
District Court noted, "Marshak has cited no testimony or other evidence 
that he or his assignors subjectively believed that the dismissal of 
Treadwell's 1971 lawsuit constituted afinal adjudication of their 
trademark rights," 58 F.Supp. 2d at 562, and thus established that 
Treadwell had no right to the use of"The Drifters" name. 
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43(a) counterclaim. On appeal, Marshak challenges this 
disposition on several grounds. 
 
A. 
 
Marshak contends that the District Court err ed in 
entering judgment as a matter of law against him on the 
issue of abandonment.10 W e do not agree. 
 
Section 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1127, provides 
that "[a] mark shall be deemed abandoned . . . [w]hen its 
use has been discontinued with intent not to r esume use." 
"To establish the defense of abandonment it is necessary to 
show not only acts indicating a practical abandonment, but 
an actual intent to abandon." Saxlehner v. Eisner & 
Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19, 31 (1900). "Intent not to 
resume may be inferred from cir cumstances," 15 U.S.C. 
S 1127, but "abandonment, being in the nature of a 
forfeiture, must be strictly proved." United States Jaycees v. 
Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
Thus, in order to show that there was an abandonment 
of the common law rights originally acquired by George 
Treadwell and The Drifters, Inc., Marshak bore the burden 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Even if the jury had sustained Marshak's federal registration, it 
would still be necessary to consider the question of abandonment. Even 
if a junior user's mark has attained incontestable status, such status 
does not cut off the rights of a senior user . See Natural Footware Ltd. 
v. 
Hart, Schnaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1395 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[A] federal 
registrant is still subject to the defense of a prior user of the mark who 
has established a market in specific areas notwithstanding that senior 
user's failure to register.");see also 815 Tonawanda Street Corp.v. Fay's 
Drug Co., 842 F.2d 643, 646 (2d Cir . 1988) ("[T]he plain meaning of the 
S 1065 exception is that if a party has acquir ed common-law trademark 
rights continuing since before the publication of the federal 
registration, 
then to that extent the registration will not be incontestable.") 
(citations 
omitted)); Cuban Cigar Brands N.V. v. Upmann Int'l, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 
1090, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[D]efendant's marks are not incontestable 
as against that of plaintiff for, since defendant's use infringes 
plaintiff 's 
valid common law rights obtained long prior to defendant's registration, 
it has no shield of incontestability in a suit by plaintiff to enforce 
that 
mark."). Since Marshak has used "The Drifters" continuously since 1970, 
his ability to enjoin Treadwell's use depends on whether she abandoned 
the mark. 
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of "strickly" proving (a) that use of The Drifters mark had 
been discontinued in the United States1 1 and (b) that the 
owner of the common law rights had the actual intent to 
abandon the mark. Marshak could have established a 
prima facie case of abandonment, however, by proving non- 
use in this country for two consecutive years. Lanham Act 
S 45, 15 U.S.C. 1127 (1994).12 
 
Here, the District Court found that ther e was no 
abandonment as a matter of law because "the original 
Drifters recordings have been played on the radio and sold 
in record stores, without interruption, for the past 40 
years." Marshak, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 575. The District Court 
adopted the reasoning of The Kingsmen v. K-Tel Int'l, Ltd., 
557 F. Supp. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), in which the court 
held that a mark designating a disbanded singing gr oup 
remained in use because the group's r ecordings were 
played and the group continued to collect r oyalties. The 
court wrote: 
 
       We find that defendants have failed to show either non- 
       use or intent to abandon. Even though plaintif fs 
       disbanded their group in 1967 and ceased r ecording 
       new material, there is no evidence suggesting that they 
       failed to use the name Kingsmen during the period 
       from 1967 to the present to promote their previously 
       recorded albums. Moreover, the fact that these 
       individuals continue to receive royalties for Kingsmen 
       recordings flies in the face of any suggestion of intent 
       to abandon use of the name Kingsmen. These plaintif fs 
       have no more abandoned their right to pr otect the 
       name of Kingsmen than have The Beatles, The 
       Supremes or any other group that has disbanded and 
       ceased performing and recor ding, but continues to 
       collect royalties from the sale of pr eviously recorded 
       material. We must reject defendants' contentions that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. For purposes of trademark rights in the United States, "use" means 
use in the United States, not in other nations. See Rivard v. Linville, 
133 
F.3d 1446, 1448-49 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 
12. In 1994, the statute was amended to pr ovide that three, not two, 
years of nonuse were needed to make out a prima facie case of 
abandonment. 
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       the name Kingsmen has been abandoned to the public 
       domain. 
 
Id. 
 
We concur with this reasoning, and we also agree with 
the District Court that it mandates the entry of judgment 
as a matter of law against Marshak. As the District Court 
put it, "[a] successful musical group does not abandon its 
mark unless there is proof that the owner ceased to 
commercially exploit the mark's secondary meaning in the 
music industry." Marshak, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 575; see also 
Robi v. Reed, 173 F.3d 736 (9th Cir . 1999); HEC Enters., 
Ltd. v. Deep Purple, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 991 (C.D. Cal. 1980). 
 
Marshak bore the burden of proving non-use and actual 
intent to abandon. United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia 
Jaycees, 639 F.2d at 139. Tr eadwell's Drifters were entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of 
abandonment because, even giving Marshak the benefit of 
all reasonable inferences, Bar na v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 
F.3d 809, 813 n.5 (3d Cir. 1994), the evidence was 
insufficient to establish those elements. Motter v. Everest & 
Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Marshak did not prove non-use, i.e., that the classic 
recordings of "The Drifters" wer e not played and that the 
resulting royalties were not paid. On the contrary, the 
parties stipulated that "The Drifters" r ecords and albums 
continue to be played and sold in the United States and 
that many of their songs have now been recor ded on 
compact disk and re-released. App. at 110. In addition, 
Treadwell testified that The Drifters, Inc. and Treadwell 
Drifters, Inc. have continuously received r oyalties from 
Atlantic Records for the sale of Drifters r ecords in the 
United States. App. at 720. Likewise, Marshak failed to 
prove an actual intent to abandon. The continuous use of 
the mark in connection with the commercial exploitation of 
the group's recordings in this country gave rise to a strong 
inference of an intent not to abandon the mark. 
 
In arguing that judgment as a matter of law was 
improper, Marshak relies on the following evidence. First, 
Treadwell dropped her 1971 action against Marshak in New 
York state court after the court denied her application for a 
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preliminary injunction and issued an unfavorable opinion. 
Second, Treadwell did not oppose the federal registration of 
Marshak's mark or previously seek to have it canceled. 
Third, Treadwell failed to challenge numerous violations of 
"The Drifters" name, whereas Marshak stopped those uses 
through legal action. Fourth, Treadwell left for England in 
1972. Fifth, Treadwell's English r ecording contracts did not 
provide for distribution in the United States. However, once 
it is recognized that the commercial exploitation of classic 
Drifters recordings in this country constitutes use, it is 
apparent that the evidence that Marshak cites is 
insufficient to show either the non-use and or the actual 
intent to abandon that are necessary for afinding of 
abandonment. 
 
B. 
 
Marshak argues that the District Court err ed in holding 
that he infringed the common-law rights held by 
Treadwell's Drifters. We conclude, however, that Treadwell's 
Drifters were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 
their infringement claim. 
 
As previously noted, Treadwell's Drifters were required to 
show (1) that their mark was valid and legally pr otectable; 
(2) that they owned the mark; and (3) that Marshak's use 
of the mark to identify his group was likely to create 
confusion concerning their origin. Fisons Horticulture, Inc., 
30 F.3d at 472. In view of our holding r egarding 
abandonment, there can be no question r egarding elements 
one and two, and we do not understand Marshak to contest 
those elements on any other ground. 
 
With regard to the third element, Marshak argues that 
the District Court should not have disturbed the jury's 
finding that Marshak had not used "The Drifters" name in 
such a way as to misrepresent the sour ce of his goods or 
services or to falsely suggest a connection between those 
services and Treadwell's Drifters. App. at 1562. We agree 
with the District Court, however, that a r easonable 
factfinder could not fail to find a likelihood of confusion on 
the facts of this case. As the District Court wr ote, 
"Marshak's group performs under the name `The Drifters' 
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and sings the same hit songs that were r ecorded and made 
famous by the original Drifters in the fifties and sixties. 
There is surely a likelihood of confusion because the public 
is misled to believe that Marshak's singers and the famous 
Drifters records originate from the same source." App. at 
1681-82. Although infringement is generally a question for 
the jury, the evidence here mandated judgment for the 
counterclaimant and justified the entry of the permanent 
injunction barring Marshak from using the Drifters mark. 
We have considered all of Marshak's ar guments, and we 
find no basis for reversal of the portions of the District 
Court's orders that are properly before us. 
 
V. 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the or ders of the District 
Court insofar as they order cancellation of Marshak's 
federal registration and permanently enjoin Marshak from 
using The Drifters name in commerce. We dismiss the 
appeal insofar as it contests the order for an accounting of 
profits. 
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